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INTRODUCTION: WHAT DOES OAKLEY 
TELL US ABOUT THE FAILURES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING? 
TAYLOR FLYNN* 
As the articles in this symposium illustrate, the Wisconsin Su­
preme Court's decision in State v. Oakley,1 in which the court up­
held a probation order prohibiting Mr. Oakley from fathering 
additional children until he could support them? is a compelling 
* Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. 
J.S.M.1995, Stanford Law School; J.D. 1991, Columbia Law School; B.A. 1986, 
Dartmouth College. 
1. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). Mr. Oakley, the father of nine 
children, failed to pay any child support during the relevant time period and was in 
arrears in excess of $25,000. [d. at 201-02. Mr. Oakley challenged the constitutionality 
of the condition of his probation that he not father another child unless he could show 
that he could support that child and his current children, arguing that the condition 
violated his right to procreate. [d. at 201. The Wisconsin supreme court held that the 
probation condition was not overbroad, as it did not eliminate Oakley's ability to exer­
cise his constitutional right to procreate. [d. at 212-213. The court found that Mr. 
Oakley could satisfy the condition of probation by making efforts to support his chil­
dren as required by law. [d. at 212. The condition was reasonably related to the proba­
tionary goal of rehabilitation because it would assist Oakley in conforming is conduct to 
the law. [d. at 213. Further, the condition was determined to be narrowly tailored to 
serve the compelling state interest of requiring parents to support their children as well 
as rehabilitating those convicted of crimes. [d. 
2. The precise terms and potential effects of the order are contested. 
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example of a troubling flaw in our constitutional jurisprudence. 
Absent the countervailing check perhaps provided by the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions,3 each path of doctrinal analysis, con­
sidered separately, arguably leads to the conclusion that the proba­
tion order is valid. This is so even though a number of institutional, 
structural, and process-based considerations converge to render the 
order's constitutionality highly suspect. The prevailing doctrinal 
approach is to dis aggregate the case into distinct lines of argument. 
Do the poor constitute a "discrete and insular minority"? The arti­
cles by Professors Richard Cole, David Papke, and Bruce Miller 
take up the challenge of considering historical, legal, and cultural 
approaches to poverty. Are probation conditions subject to height­
ened scrutiny? Professor Jennifer Levi argues, in part, that even a 
radical change in the standard of review would not change the out­
come of either the majority or dissenting opinions. Is this a case 
involving discrimination based on sex? Professor Jennifer Martin 
considers the impact that the Oakley decision may have on women, 
especially those subject to domestic violence. 
How is it possible that the machinery of constitutional inter­
pretation gave us this result? These articles suggest that there is no 
single answer. In fact, one failing of our current mode of constitu­
tional inquiry is apparently that the legal analysis tends to consider 
only one variable at a time. Each of the individual inquiries above 
me be rejected in turn, without consideration of the interconnected 
and overarching issues raised by the case. This symposium provides 
us with the opportunity to do just that. Taken as a whole, the arti­
cles raise even larger, more systemic concerns. What is the judici­
ary's role in interpreting the Constitution? Is it relevant that the 
claimed violation stems from a judicial, rather than legislative act? 
How should the Constitution safeguard the rights of the least em­
powered in society? Because only one other case to date has up­
held restrictions on procreation as a condition of probation,4 the 
Oakley decision could be dismissed as nothing more than an aber­
rant result from the supreme court of a single state. As these arti­
cles demonstrate, however, the questions raised by Oakley are 
precisely some of the central concerns that underlie the Constitu­
tional project itself. 
3. There is a strong argument that the doctrine f unconstitutional conditions ap­
plies in Oakley. See generally Jennifer Levi, Probation Restrictions Impacting the Right 
to Procreate: The Oakley Error, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 78 (2004). 
4. See Levi, supra note 3, at 88-89. 
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In considering the clash of liberty (or liberties) in Oakley, Pro­
fessor Richard Cole rejects the classic liberal constitutional focus on 
the protection of individual autonomy from intrusion from the 
state. Instead of assuming that individual and community interests 
necessarily diverge, Professor Cole looks to Biblical and Talmudic 
law and ponders whether preferable resolutions may be possible in 
Mr. Oakley's situation using Iubilean principals of liberation and 
empowerment.5 The Iubilean Year, described in the Old Testa­
ment, envisioned a radical socio-economic transformation. Con­
ceived of as a sabbatical year to occur once every half century, the 
Iubilee Year was meant to liberate citizens from forms of bondage­
debt and slavery. While the Iubilean liberation was a radical act, it 
was also a conservative movement with the goal of restoring tradi­
tional community. For Cole, the potential of Iubilean principles 
rests in the joinder of individual freedom with the needs of the 
wider community. 
Viewing Mr. Oakley's poverty as a form of bondage, Professor 
Cole considers what the application of Iubilean principles might 
mean for David Oakley. Cole posits that, using a Iubilean ap­
proach, judges and other lawmakers would attempt to empower the 
individual by considering his or her social, economic, and cultural 
circumstances. Analogizing redistribution of land in the Mosaic 
world to the contemporary emphasis on education as the key to 
economic independence; Cole states, for example, that lawmakers 
should allocate greater community resources towards education, 
job training, and financial support.6 Because the purpose of the 
Iubilean approach is to empower individuals by removing obstacles 
that impede success (rather than to coerce conformity with particu­
lar standards of conduct, as under the criminal system), the Iubilean 
model may give individuals an opportunity to flourish, and, hope­
fully, to give back to the community that has supported them. 
The article by Professor David Papke ties in nicely with Profes­
sor Cole's consideration of empowerment. Professor Papke criti­
cizes the assumption, which he finds in the Oakley majority and 
dissenting opinions, that "Oakley is an agent rather than a victim of 
poverty."7 Mr. Oakley, born in the prison where his mother was 
incarcerated, had repeated run-ins with the police from a young 
5. See Richard P. Cole, Liberation and Empowerment: A Jubilean Alternative for 
State v. Oakley, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 27 (2004). 
6. Id. at 59-63. 
7. See David Ray Papke, State v. Oakley, Deadbeat Dads, and American Poverty, 
26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 26 (2004). 
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age. With Mr. Oakley's story in mind, Professor Papke considers 
the development of child support law and the current legal focus on 
so-called "deadbeat dads." Papke concludes that many child sup­
port laws reflect an animosity towards non-paying parents with lit­
tle interest in a parent's actual ability to pay: the statute 
disparagingly entitled "Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act," for in­
stance, creates a presumption that a delinquent parent is able to pay 
the support owed.s For the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Papke as­
serts, Mr. Oakley had come to personify not just all "deadbeats" 
but also the evils associated with poverty itself. Professor Papke 
compares the individualist notion of self-reliance inherent in the 
American legal system (which blames the "fault" of poverty on 
those impoverished) with the structural view of poverty more prev­
alent in Europe (which posits that the social and governmental sys­
tems failed those who are poor). In the end, Papke turns to 
academics, urging us to move beyond the "sterility" of poverty-re­
lated discourse and instead to re-examine our understanding of 
poverty and its causes.9 
Professor Bruce Miller takes another look at history. He 
traces the child support laws under which Mr. Oakley was convicted 
to the Elizabethan Poor Laws enacted in England during the six­
teenth century.lO By providing a small measure of financial support 
for those living in poverty, the Elizabethan Poor Laws incorporated 
the concept of public fiscal responsibility towards the poor while 
enacting a form of recompense-ostensibly the improved moral 
character of the impoverished, who were pilloried as "idle 
vagabonds."11 The Poor Laws required that recipients engage in 
"continual labor" or face imprisonment.12 They also established a 
set of family law rules unique to the poor. While wealthy or self­
supporting parents had no obligation to support their children, par­
ents living in poverty were assessed monthly child support pay­
ments.13 Professor Miller contends that the stigmatic notion of the 
so-called "welfare queen" continues this ritualized degradation of 
the poor and functions to deter poor persons from utilizing the as­
sistance available.14 He also notes that the effects of a poverty­
8. Id. at 22-23. 
9. Id. at 26. 
10. Bruce K. Miller, A Sturdy Rogue, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 105 (2004). 
11. Id. at 111-12. 
12. Id. at 114. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 120-21. 
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based dual system of child support continues, pointing to the 1996 
Welfare Reform Act's requirement that the prosecutors pursue 
non-supporting parents who receive public assistance. Given lim­
ited prosecutorial resources, enforcement tends to be aimed at the 
poor, while middle and high income parents who fail to pay support 
often escape prosecution. The goal of the Elizabethan Poor Laws 
and the current welfare system, Miller asserts, extends even further 
than deterring those is poverty from accessing public support: by 
punishing the poor, these laws function as a reminder to low wage 
laborers that there is "a fate worse" than their daily struggles in 
underpaid and often demeaning jobs. IS 
Professor Jennifer Martin considers another marginalized 
group, adversely impacted by the Oakley decision: women. In fact, 
there is a significant overlap between these two groups: as the 
Oakley majority makes clear, a disproportionate number of single 
parents living in poverty are women, and one of the court's primary 
rationales for its ruling is to help ensure that impoverished women 
and children receive the support they need.16 Professor Martin ex­
pands upon the dissenting opinions in Oakley, which point out that 
the probation condition involves not only Mr. Oakley's procreative 
choices but those of his pregnant partnerP In addition to creating 
a situation "coercive of abortion" by conditioning eight years im­
prisonment of Oakley on the birth of his child, the probation order 
subjects his partner to potential violence or other forms of intimida­
tion by creating an incentive for Mr. Oakley to demand that his 
partner terminate her pregnancy.18 Professor Martin places partic­
ular focus on the chain of destructive consequences that may result 
for victims of domestic violence. An abuser may use every form of 
physical, economic, and legal coercion available to harass or control 
his partner. He may coerce her to terminate her pregnancy. If she 
and the batterer have other children, he may attempt to use the 
judicial process to fight aggressively for custody. The abuser may 
harass her at work, making it impossible for her to keep her job; he 
15. Id. 
16. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Wis. 2001). For an examination of in­
tersectionality issues and the ways in which the law dis aggregates the harms flowing 
from discrimination based on an individual's membership in multiple oppressed groups, 
see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN L. REv. 1241 (1991). 
17. Jennifer Martin, Coercive Abortions and Criminalizing the Birth of Children: 
Some Thoughts on the Impact on Women of State v. Oakley, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
65 (2004). 
18. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
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may seek prosecution under child support laws if she is unable to 
pay. In effect, an abused woman may be driven into poverty: the 
Oakley decision may be harming the very people whom the court is 
trying to help. 
Professor Jennifer Levi situates the Oakley decision in the con­
text of probation conditions imposed nationwide. After surveying 
probation cases, Professor Levi concludes that although the result 
in Oakley may be unusual, its analytical approach is straightforward 
and unremarkable. While the majority and dissent appear to pre­
sume that the standard of review is the major point of contention, 
Professor Levi notes that whether applying strict scrutiny or ra­
tional basis review, the majority would uphold the probation re­
striction while the dissent would strike it down,19 This consistency 
in outcome, despite the standard applied, leads Levi to search for 
another explanation for the unusual result in Oakley. She finds her 
answer in the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The doctrine 
prohibits the state from conditioning a discretionary benefit on the 
infringement of a fundamental righPO The heart of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is the premise that the government may 
not do indirectly that which it is forbidden to do directly. Under 
the doctrine, Professor Levi reasons, the state may not impose 
greater restrictions on a probationer's fundamental rights (in the 
guise of conditioning the "benefit" of probation on the govern­
ment's impairment of a right) than it could impose on the rights of 
an incarcerated person. Relying on the Supreme Court decisions 
Turner v. Safley and Zablocki v. Redhail, in which the Court struck 
down restrictions on an inmate's right to marry, Levi concludes that 
similar infringements on a prisoner's equally fundamental right to 
procreate would also fail,21 Because the ban on Mr. Oakley's abil­
ity to procreate would be unconstitutional if applied to Mr. Oakley 
as an inmate, then under the doctrine of unconstitutional condi­
tions, Professor Levi concludes, the infringement must fail when ap­
plied to him as a probationer. 
Each of these articles implicates a broader, institutional diffi­
cUlty: the failure, not limited to the Oakley court, to consider in any 
meaningful way the role of judicial decision-making in the context 
of probation. While courts have rejected arguments urging height­
19. Levi, supra note 3, at 92-93. 
20. Id. at 100. 
21. /d. at 98-100 (discussing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)). 
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ened review of probation orders, the typical considerations that 
provide the basis for judicial restraint are largely absent for the re­
view of probation orders. In contrast to review of legislative or ad­
ministrative actions, in which judicial deference to the decisions of 
co-equal branches of government is generally warranted, probation 
orders do not directly raise separation of powers concerns. Proba­
tion conditions are often set by a lower court judge who has largely 
unfettered discretion in crafting her order. Unlike legislation, 
which reflects the will of the majority arrived at via the democratic 
process, a probation order (at its worst) may be little more that the 
imposition of the idiosyncratic preferences of an individual judge. 
Moreover, the judicial deference normally granted to prison offi­
cials is not appropriate for probation orders. Probation orders not 
only originate from the same governmental branch that later re­
views them: the orders are issues by the very branch presumably 
lacking the specialized expertise that is the basis for deference to 
prison authorities. 
Another consideration that militates towards exercising greater 
judicial solitude is the obvious concern that a constitutional right is 
at stake. Without rehashing the arguments in Oakley regarding 
whether the right to procreate necessarily requires the application 
of strict scrutiny, a quick reference to Marbury v. Madison should 
be a sufficient reminder that it is particularly within the province of 
the judiciary to safeguard constitutional rights.22 Nor is this just any 
old "bargain basement" constitutional right. The right to reproduc­
tive freedom is among the most culturally important and embattled 
of our constitutional guarantees-one need only follow the nomina­
tion process for the federal bench for evidence of its significance.23 
As Professor Martin discusses-and as is suggested by the gender 
split among the Oakley jurists (with the four male justices voting to 
uphold the constitution and the three female justices voting to 
strike it down)-it is also a right that implicates sex equality con­
cerns. In particular, the possibility that Mr. Oakley might attempt 
to control his partner's reproductive decisions is precisely the out­
come the Supreme Court prohibited in the context of spousal con­
sent requirements for abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.24 
Even though it did not undertake a traditional sex discrimination 
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
23. A federal judicial nominee's (dis)agreement with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 503 U.S. 833 (1992), is often considered to be 
a litmus test for the likelihood of a nominee's Congressional confirmation. 
24. Casey, 505 U.S. at 888-89. 
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analysis, the Court's nullification of the spousal consent require­
ment reflected a rare recognition by the Court of the entrenched 
inequalities of gendered power. It is also an even rarer, albeit indi­
rect, implementation of the process and anti-subordination con­
cerns emanating from that most famous of dicta, CaroLene 
Products' footnote four.25 Similarly, the OakLey court could have 
struck down the probation order (without the necessity of holding 
that this was a sex discrimination case, simpliciter) on the ground 
that the order may impermissibly result in the subjugation of Mr. 
Oakley's female partners through violence and the loss of repro­
ductive control. 
A final factor militating towards heightened judicial solicitude 
is that Mr. Oakley, like many probationers, lives in poverty, as do 
the women with whom he has had relationships, and the children 
they have borne. Does the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision 
create the reproductive equivalent of a debtor's prison? The an­
swer appears to turn on the interpretation of the probation order: 
does it, as the order's language suggests, prohibit Mr. Oakley from 
fathering children until he can support all of them, or does it, as the 
majority concludes, require him to make some effort to pay?26 The 
latter implies that Mr. Oakley "holds the key" and could avoid the 
restriction by paying what he can afford. The former effectively 
operates as an absolute ban on future procreation because the facts 
indicate that Mr. Oakley is unable to fully support his children.27 I 
would argue that the "correct" answer to this question is less impor­
tant than the question itself. When a right so integral to our indi­
vidual autonomy could be completely barred, consideration of the 
judiciary's role suggests that it err on the side of ensuring constitu­
tional protections. Even though the Supreme Court has long re­
fused to grant increased scrutiny of governmental action that 
unduly burdens the poor,2s the discussions by Professors Papke and 
Miller concerning the historical and ongoing hostility to the poor 
demonstrate that the process concerns animating footnote four ap­
ply with particular force to those living in poverty. 
25. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938). 
26. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202-03. 
27. Id. at 208. 
28. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting 
the proposition that wealth-based classifications are suspect). For a critique of the Su­
preme Court's reasoning in this case, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: 
American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461 (2003). 
